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The Paraguayan War (1864-1870) 
Part I. The Paraguayan War: History and Historiography 
The Paraguayan War (1864-70) began formally with declarations of war by 
Paraguay's dictator Francisco Solano Lopez, first on the Empire of Brazil in 
December 1864, then on the Argentine Republic in March 1865, followed by 
invasions of their territories. With the signing of a Treaty of Triple Alliance 
(May 1865) it became a war waged by Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay for the 
destruction of Paraguay. The Paraguayan War, or War of the Triple Alliance, 
was the longest and bloodiest inter-state war in the history of Latin America. 
Indeed it was the longest and, apart from the Crimean War (1854-56) which cost 
over 450,000 lives (two thirds of them Russian), the bloodiest inter-state war 
anywhere in the world between the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 and the 
outbreak of the First World War in 1914. It lasted for more than five years, 
ending only with the death of Solano Lopez at the hands of Brazilian soldiers on 
1 March 1870, and claimed 150-200,000 lives (mostly Paraguayan and Brazilian) 
either in battle or from disease and deprivation associated with the war.1 The 
War had a profound effect on the economies, politics and society of all four 
countries engaged, especially the two that did most of the fighting: Paraguay, the 
principal loser, and Brazil, the principal victor. 
Antecedents 
In a certain sense the Paraguayan War has its roots in the struggle between Spain 
and Portugal in the 17th and 18th centuries and between the newly independent 
United Provinces of the Rio de la Plata (Argentina) - and more specifically the 
province of Buenos Aires - and first Portugal, then the newly independent 
Empire of Brazil in the second and third decades of the 19th century for control 
* This is a revised and expanded version of an essay originally published as an 
Introduction to Maria Eduarda Castro Magalhaes Marques (coord.), A Guerra do 
Paraguai: 130 anos depois (Rio de Janeiro: Editores Relume Dumara 1995), a volume 
which included papers presented at an international colloquium organised by the Fundagao 
Roberto Marinho, with the support of the Banco Real, and held at the Biblioteca Nacional 
in Rio de Janeiro on 23 November 1994. I have incorporated some material from a 
lecture I gave on 'Politics, Society and Culture in Brazil during the Paraguayan War 
(1864-70)' at King's College London on 26 October 1995 on the occasion of the 
inauguration of the Centre for the Study of Brazilian Culture and Society. 
1 There were, of course, several prolonged and extremely savage 19th century civil 
wars: notably, in the middle decades of the century, the Taiping wars in China in the 
1850s and 1860s, with incalculable loss of life, and the American Civil War (1861-65), 
in which more than 600,000 Yankee and Confederate soldiers died. 
of the so-called Banda Oriental of the Rio de la Plata. This conflict had, 
however, been largely resolved long before the events that led directly to the 
outbreak of the Paraguayan War. In 1828, after British mediation, the 
independent republic of Uruguay had been established as a buffer state between 
Argentina and Brazil. And in 1851-2 the Argentine dictator Juan Manuel de 
Rosas, the main enemy of an independent Uruguay, had been defeated by an 
earlier Triple Alliance consisting of Uruguay, Brazil and the Argentine provinces 
opposed to Rosas and domination by Buenos Aires led by Entre Rios (and its 
caudillo General Jose Justo de Urquiza). In the conflict in the Rio de la Plata in 
1863-4 Argentina and Brazil found themselves - for the first time - on the same 
side and not prepared to go to war - at least not with each other. 
It was an episode in the long-running civil war between Blancos 
(Conservatives) and Colorados (Liberals) in Uruguay - the rebellion led by the 
Colorado caudillo General Venancio Flores for the overthrow of the Blanco 
government of President Bernardo Berro in April 1863 - that triggered off the 
sequence of events leading to the Paraguayan War. Both Argentina and Brazil 
supported the Colorado rebellion. President Bartolome Mitre of Argentina, a 
Liberal, elected in October 1862, took this position because the Uruguayan 
Colorados had backed him in the Argentine civil war of 1861 and because he 
believed the Blancos in power in Montevideo constituted a possible focus for 
residual federalist opposition in the provinces to the recently united Argentine 
republic. Brazil's position was a little more complicated. During the 1850s Brazil 
had dramatically increased its economic and financial interest in, and political 
influence over, Uruguay. By the end of the decade over 20,000 Brazilian 
subjects, mostly gauchos from Rio Grande do Sul, together with their slaves, 
were settled there. Brazilians constituted more than 10 per cent of Uruguay's 
population. They owned perhaps 30 per cent of the land, including some of the 
best estates, and freely transported their cattle to saladeros in Rio Grande do Sul. 
The Blanco (Conservative) administration elected in 1860, however, had begun 
to adopt a tough line, attempting to restrict Brazilian settlement (and 
slaveholding) and to control - and tax - cross-frontier trade. Rio Grande do Sul, 
which had abandoned its struggle for independent statehood only 15 years before, 
expected the imperial government in Rio de Janeiro to protect its interests in 
Uruguay. The Liberal party was already dominant in Rio Grande do Sul, and as 
the political tide nationally began to turn in favour of the Liberals (culminating 
in January 1864 in the appointment of a Liberal-Progressive government under 
Zacarias Gois e Vasconcelos) Brazilian governments became increasingly 
responsive to pressure from Rio Grande do Sul to join Argentina in supporting 
the Colorado rebellion led by General Flores. It was in these circumstances that 
the Blanco government in Uruguay looked to Paraguay as its only possible ally. 
Paraguay, the former province of the Viceroyalty of the Rio de la Plata that 
had successfully separated itself from both Spain and Buenos Aires in 1811-13, 
was geographically isolated: until Bolivia's defeat in the War of the Pacific at the 
end of the century it alone of the newly independent Latin American states was 
landlocked. As a predominantly Guaram-speaking nation it was culturally 
isolated. And under the dictatorship of Dr Jose Gaspar Rodriguez de Francia 
(1813-40) and (at least until the 1850s) under the dictatorship of his successor 
Carlos Antonio Lopez (1844-62), it had also isolated itself politically and 
economically from its neighbours. Paraguay had played only a minor role in the 
civil and inter-state wars of the Rio de la Plata during the first half of the 19th 
century. It was, however, fearful and distrustful of its two much larger, much 
more populous and potentially predatory neighbours: the United Provinces of the 
Rio de la Plata (Argentina) and Brazil. Both, but especially Argentina, had been 
reluctant, and late, to recognise Paraguay's independence. Both had territorial 
claims against Paraguay: Brazil in the far northeast of the country on the borders 
of Mato Grosso, a region economically valuable for its natural yerba mate 
forests; Argentina east of the Parana river (Misiones) but also west of the 
Paraguay river, a remote area potentially valuable for its quebracho trees from 
which tannin was extracted. And there was friction with both over the freedom 
(or otherwise) of navigation on the Paraguay-Parana river system and access to 
regional markets. Brazil required Paraguay to give the province of Mato Grosso 
access to the Rio Parana and thus to the Atlantic via the river Paraguay. 
Paraguay required Argentina to give it access to the Atlantic via the Rio Parana. 
During the 1850s, as first Brazil and then Argentina overcame the obstacles to 
their internal unity and stability and as Brazil in particular adopted what 
Paraguay regarded as an imperialist policy towards Uruguay, the government of 
Carlos Antonio Lopez pursued with increasing urgency its policy of economic 
- and military - modernisation, making effective use of British technology and 
British technicians. 
Francisco Solano Lopez, to whom the Berro government in Montevideo 
appealed for help in July 1863, had come to power in Paraguay in October 1862 
on the death of his father. Hesitant at first to make a formal alliance with the 
Blancos, his natural allies, against the Colorados in Uruguay now that the latter 
were backed by both Brazil and Argentina, Solano Lopez during the second half 
of the year increasingly began to warn Argentina and Brazil against what he saw 
as a growing threat to the existing balance of power in the Rio de la Plata which 
guaranteed Paraguay's security, territorial integrity and independence. He also 
saw an opportunity to make his presence felt in the region, to play a role 
commensurate with Paraguay's new economic and military power. Early in 1864 
he began to mobilise for a possible war, taking advantage of the military 
preeminence Paraguay enjoyed at the time, as we shall see. 
When, after diplomacy had failed to resolve its differences with the 
Uruguayan government, the Zacarias administration in Rio eventually issued, on 
4 August 1864, an ultimatum to Uruguay threatening retaliation for the alleged 
abuses suffered by Brazilian subjects and direct intervention on behalf of the 
Colorado rebels, Solano Lopez on 30 August issued an ultimatum to Brazil 
against intervention in Uruguay. After his warning was ignored and Brazilian 
troops invaded Uruguay on 16 October, Solano Lopez on 12 November 
precipitated war by seizing the Brazilian merchant vessel the Marques de Olinda 
as it left Asuncion for Corumba with the president of the province of Mato 
Grosso on board, and on 13 December he took the momentous decision to 
declare war on Brazil and invaded Mato Grosso. And after Argentina refused 
permission for the Paraguayan army to cross the disputed and largely uninhabited 
territory of Misiones in order to invade Rio Grande do Sul, and ultimately 
Uruguay, Solano Lopez on 18 March 1865 declared war on Argentina as well, 
and the following month invaded the Argentine province of Corrientes. 
Thus Francisco Solano Lopez began what became the Paraguayan War. To 
what extent his actions were rational, provoked by Brazil and Argentina, and 
essentially in defence of threatened national interests (perhaps even his country's 
survival), or irrational, aggressive, and expansionist - Brazilian intervention in 
Uruguay offering a pretext and an opportunity for a megalomaniac to realise a 
dream of empire? - is still a matter for debate. But whatever the thinking behind 
his actions, whatever the motivation, Solano Lopez's decision to declare war first 
on Brazil and then on Argentina, and to invade both their territories, proved a 
serious miscalculation, and one that was to have tragic consequences for the 
Paraguayan people. At the very least Solano Lopez made an enormous gamble 
- and lost. He failed to recognise the realities of power in the Rio de la Plata. 
He overestimated Paraguay's economic and military power. He underestimated 
Brazil's potential, if not its existing, military power - and its willingness to fight. 
He was wrong in thinking that Argentina would be neutral in a war between 
Paraguay and Brazil over Uruguay. Mitre did not believe that Argentine 
interests, including the continued independence of Uruguay, were threatened by 
what he expected to be a brief, surgical Brazilian intervention in Uruguay in 
defence of its own interests. Solano Lopez also exaggerated Argentina's internal 
contradictions and the possibility that, for example, Entre Rios (still under the 
leadership of Urquiza) and Corrientes would prevent Argentina from waging war 
against Paraguay or in the event of war would take Paraguay's side against 
Buenos Aires. 
Thus Solano Lopez's reckless actions brought about the very thing that most 
threatened the security, even the existence, of his country: a union of his two 
powerful neighbours - indeed, since Flores had finally managed to seize power 
in Montevideo in February 1865, a union of all three of his neighbours - in 
alliance and war against him. Neither Brazil nor Argentina had a quarrel with 
Paraguay sufficient to justify going to war. Neither wished nor planned for war 
with Paraguay. There was no popular demand or support for war; indeed, the 
war proved to be generally unpopular in both countries, especially Argentina. At 
the same time little effort was made to avoid war. The need to defend themselves 
against Paraguayan aggression (however much provoked or justified) offered 
both Brazil and Argentina not only an opportunity to settle their differences with 
Paraguay over territory and river navigation but also to punish and weaken, 
perhaps destroy, a troublesome, emerging (expansionist?) power in their region. 
Mitre seized the chance to remove a regime which, like the Blancos in Uruguay, 
he regarded as a perpetual focus for federalist resistance to Buenos Aires and 
thus a constant threat to the process of nation building in Argentina. Pedro II 
seized the chance to strengthen and consolidate the Imperial system and assert 
Brazil's undisputed hegemony in the region, and in particular Brazilian rather 
than Argentine hegemony over Paraguay as well as Uruguay. As the war 
progressed, it became, for Brazil in particular, not just a war for the overthrow 
of the Solano Lopez dictatorship, guarantees of free navigation on the 
Paraguay/Parana rivers and the dismemberment of Paraguay - the original war 
aims of the Triple Alliance (the last of which was kept secret until revealed by 
Britain in 1866) - but a war for civilisation (and democracy) against barbarism 
(and tyranny). This despite the awkward fact that as a result of the emancipation 
of the slaves in the United States during the Civil War Brazil was the only 
remaining independent state in the Western Hemisphere whose economy and 
society was based on slavery (as well as the only remaining monarchy). At the 
beginning of the War Brazil had a slave population of 1.5 - 2 million, 15-20% 
of the total population of between nine and ten million. 
The Paraguayan War was not inevitable. Nor was it necessary. But once 
Flores left Buenos Aires for Uruguay in April 1863 it could have been avoided 
only if (a) Brazil had been less assertive in defence of the interests of its subjects 
in Uruguay and in particular had not intervened militarily on their behalf; (b) 
Argentina had remained neutral in the ensuing conflict between Paraguay and 
Brazil; and, crucially, (c) Paraguay had behaved more prudently, recognised the 
realities of power in the region, and attempted to defend its interests through 
diplomacy not war. 
I address below2 the argument that, as 'client states' and 'neo-colonies', 
Argentina and Brazil were prompted and manipulated by Britain, the 'fourth 
Ally', into waging war against Paraguay. Britain's purpose allegedly was to 
undermine and destroy Paraguay's state-led, 'autonomous', economic 
development 'model', which posed a threat to the advance of its own liberal 
capitalist 'model' in the region. More specifically, its aim was to open up the 
one remaining closed economy in Latin America to British manufactured goods 
and British capital and to secure for Britain new sources of raw materials -
especially cotton in view of the disruption of supplies as a result of the US Civil 
War. This 'revisionist' thesis, rooted in the concerns of the 1960s and 1970s, has 
a certain intellectual appeal. Unfortunately, there is little or no evidence to 
support it. It is, in my view, based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the 
Paraguayan economic 'model',3 of Britain's interests in Paraguay and of 
Britain's relations with Argentina and Brazil. However, it is true that, although 
2 See Part II, 'British Imperialism and the Paraguayan War'. 
3 For a recent discussion of the Paraguayan economic 'model' as it evolved under 
the dictatorship of Carlos Antonio Lopez in the 1850s and 1860s, see Mario Pastore, 
'State-led industrialisation: the evidence on Paraguay, 1852-70', Journal of Latin 
American Studies, vol. 26, pt. 2 (1994). 
Britain was officially neutral in the War, British loans to Argentina and, more 
particularly, to Brazil and British arms made an important contribution to the 
eventual victory of the Allies over Paraguay. 
The War 
Considering the enormous disparity between the two sides in size, wealth and 
population (and therefore in real and potential human and material resources) the 
Paraguayan War would appear to have been an unequal struggle from the 
outset.4 Brazil (population almost 10 million), Argentina (population 1.5 million) 
and Uruguay (population 250-300,000) joined forces against Paraguay 
(population 300-400,000? - certainly much less than the 1 million or more still 
frequently cited). Militarily, however, the two sides were more evenly matched. 
In fact, at the beginning of the War, and for at least the first year, Paraguay 
probably had, at least numerically, a military superiority. Paraguay's standing 
army has been variously estimated at between 28,000 and 57,000 men plus 
reserves of between 20,000 and 28,000 - that is to say, virtually the entire adult 
male population was under arms. This should be compared with Argentina's 
army of 25-30,000 (only 10-15,000 of whom were available in the event of a 
foreign war, so delicate was Argentina's newly achieved internal unity and 
stability), Uruguay's of 5,000 (at most) and Brazil's of 17-20,000 (though Brazil 
also had its policia militar and a vast reserve of up to 200,000 men in the form 
of the National Guard). Paraguay's army was probably also better equipped and 
trained than the armies of its neighbours at the outset. 
In the course of the War Paraguay mobilised at least 70-80,000 men (though 
probably less than the 100,000 sometimes suggested). It could mobilise 30-
40,000 at any one time, but after the defeat at Tuiuti in May 1866 rarely fielded 
more than 20,000. Once the Paraguayan forces had been expelled from 
Argentine territory (and had no serious possibility of returning), Argentina 
reduced its commitment to the Allied war effort so that by the end of the war 
there were only some 4,000 Argentine troops on Paraguayan soil. Uruguay never 
had more than a symbolic presence in the theatre of operations. Brazil, on the 
other hand, increasingly assumed responsibility for the bulk of the fighting. 
Brazil expanded its standing army to 60-70,000 men during the first year of 
hostilities by means of forced recruitment, transfers from the policia militar and 
National Guard, the use of escravos da nagao and escravos da Casa Imperial as 
well as some privately owned slaves (freed in return for service in the war) and 
the formation of corps of voluntarios da patria (some more voluntary than 
4 For comparative data on size, population, government revenues, armed forces, etc 
of the combatants in the Paraguayan War, see Diego Abente, 'The War of the Triple 
Alliance: three explanatory models', Latin American Research Review, vol. 22, no. 2 
(1987), Table 1 Regional power capabilities of Paraguay, Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, 
c.1860, and Table 2 Weighted index of power capabilities. 
others).5 In August 1867, for example, three-quarters of the 40-45,000 Allied 
troops in the field were Brazilian. In the course of the war Brazil is estimated to 
have mobilised up to 130-150,000 men (though probably not the 200,000 
indicated by some historians). Moreover, unlike Paraguay, which had to rely on 
its own arsenal and shipyard, the Allies also had access to manufactured arms 
and warships purchased abroad, mostly in Europe, as well as loans raised in the 
City of London to help pay for them. And the Allies, or rather Brazil, had total 
naval superiority. At the beginning of the war Brazil already had the largest and 
most powerful navy in the region (33 steam and 12 sailing ships), and in 
December 1865 the first of many ironclads, the Brasil, arrived on the scene. 
The War itself can be divided into three phases. The first began with the 
limited Paraguayan offensives against Mato Grosso in December 1864 and 
Corrientes in April 1865. In May 1865 the Paraguayan army finally crossed 
Misiones and invaded Rio Grande do Sul. Initially successful, the invasion was 
eventually contained by the Allied forces. The Paraguayans never reached 
Uruguay. The Paraguayan commander Colonel Estigarribia surrendered to 
President Mitre (commander of the Allied forces during the first two and a half 
years of the war), Emperor Dom Pedro II - on his only visit to the war zone -
and President Flores at Uruguaiana on 14 September. The Paraguayan army then 
retreated back across the Parana river and prepared to defend the country's 
southern border. At the end of the first year of the war the only Paraguayan 
troops left on Allied soil were those (few) in Mato Grosso (which remained a 
secondary front in the war). In the meantime, on 11 June at Riachuela on the 
Parana below the river port of Corrientes, in the only major naval battle of the 
war, the Brazilian navy had destroyed the Paraguayan navy and instituted an 
effective blockade of Paraguay, which it maintained for the rest of the war. 
The second and major phase of the war (which included several periods in 
which there was little actual fighting) began when the Allies finally invaded 
Paraguay in April 1866 and established their headquarters at Tuiuti at the 
confluence of the rivers Parana and Paraguay. There on 24 May they repelled 
a ferocious Paraguayan assault and won the first major land battle of the war. It 
was, however, more than three months before the Allied armies began to 
advance up the River Paraguay. On 12 September, at a secret meeting between 
Solano Lopez and the Allied commander-in-chief Mitre at Yatayti-Cora, Solano 
Lopez's offer of concessions, including territorial concessions, to bring the war 
to an end, provided only that he himself survived and Paraguay was not totally 
5 An interesting recent study of mobilisation for war in Brazil, especially of blacks 
(slave, freed and free) is Ricardo Salles, Guerra do Paraguai: escravidao e cidadania na 
formagao do exercito (Rio de Janeiro, 1990). In Prince of the People. The Life and Times 
of a Brazilian Free Man of Colour (London, 1993) Eduardo Silva offers us a singular 
portrait of one free black voluntario, Candido da Fonseca Galvao, better known as Dom 
Oba II d'Africa. See also Silva, 'O Principe Oba, um voluntario da patria', in Marques 
(coord.), Guerra do Paraguai. 
dismembered or permanently occupied, was rejected. Ten days later, at 
Curupaiti, south of Humaita on the river Paraguay, the Allies suffered their 
worst defeat of the war. They did not renew their advance until July 1867 when 
a movement was initiated to encircle the great river fortress of Humaita 
(Paraguay's Sebastopol), which blocked access to the Rio Paraguay and the 
Paraguayan capital, Asuncion. Even so it was a further five months, following 
the decisive defeat and virtual destruction of the Paraguayan army at the battle 
of Lomas Valentinas on 27 December, before Allied (mostly Brazilian) troops 
under the command of the Brazilian commander in chief, the Marques de Caxias, 
finally entered Asuncion in January 1869 and brought the war to an end - or so 
they believed. 
There was, however, a third phase to the war. Solano Lopez formed a new 
army in the Cordillera east of Asuncion, and conducted a successful but limited 
guerrilla campaign against the Allied forces. He was defeated and his troops 
massacred in the last great battle of the war at Campo Grande or Acosta Nu, 
north-east of Asuncion on 16 August 1869. Even now Solano Lopez himself 
again escaped. He and his Irish companion Eliza Alicia Lynch were pursued 
northwards by Brazilian troops for a further six months before Solano Lopez was 
finally cornered and killed at Cerro Cora in the extreme northeast of Paraguay 
on 1 March 1870. 
Why did it take so long for the Allies to bring the war to a successful 
conclusion despite their overwhelming naval and, at least after Tuiutf, military 
superiority? At the beginning of the war Mitre had boasted, famously, that the 
Allies would be in Asuncion within three months. In the event it was almost four 
years before the Allies reached the Paraguayan capital. And even then the war 
dragged on for more than another year. The explanation lies, on the one hand, 
on the Allied side, or rather on the Brazilian side, since after the first year or so 
Brazil fought the war practically alone. Brazilian governments faced enormous 
logistical problems, first organising, then transporting their troops thousands of 
kilometres either overland or by sea and up river, and finally supplying their 
troops. And breaking down Paraguay's excellent land and river defence was not 
an easy task. But it is also true that Brazilian commanders demonstrated a high 
degree of strategic and tactical ineptitude. On the other hand, the Paraguayan 
troops, indeed the Paraguayan people, remained loyal to Solano Lopez and 
fought with extraordinary tenacity and in the end, when national survival was at 
stake, heroically. This, and the Allied determination to pursue the war to the 
bitter end, also explains why the war was so bloody. 
Consequences 
The War was for Paraguay an almost unqualified disaster. In the event Paraguay 
survived as an independent state (though in the immediate post-war period under 
Brazilian tutelage). The ultimate consequence of total defeat, total 
dismemberment, was avoided, not least because of the rivalry between the 
victors. Its national pride remained intact, even perhaps enhanced. But its 
territory was reduced by 40 per cent. And although population loss has been 
grossly exaggerated - even put as high as 50 per cent of Paraguay's (usually 
inflated) pre-war population, i.e. 200,000 or 300,000 or even half a million dead 
- more modest recent estimates of 15-20 per cent (or even lower) of a much 
smaller estimated pre-war population, i.e. 50-80,000 deaths, in battle as well as 
from disease (measles, small pox, yellow fever and cholera), are enormously 
high percentages by the standards of any modern war.6 Paraguay's economy was 
left in ruins, its manufacturing base and infrastructure destroyed, the beginnings 
of development outwards through greater trade and closer integration into the 
world economy set back a generation. A huge indemnity was imposed by the 
victors, although this was eventually cancelled (not, however, in the case of 
Brazil until the Second World War!). What was left of Paraguay's army was 
disarmed, its famous and formidable river fortifications permanently dismantled. 
Brazilian (and some Argentine) troops remained in occupation for almost a 
decade. 
Argentina suffered estimated (possibly exaggerated) losses of 18,000 in battle 
plus 5,000 in internal disturbances triggered by the war and 12,000 in cholera 
epidemics. The territory it gained fell short of its ambitions, astute Brazilian 
diplomacy keeping Argentina out of the Northern Chaco. But it secured Misiones 
finally, and the Chaco Central up to the Rio Pilcomayo. An increasingly strong, 
potentially expansionist Paraguay had been removed from the politics of the Rio 
de la Plata. And on balance the war had contributed positively to national 
consolidation: Entre Rios and Corrientes had not broken ranks; montonero 
rebellions in various provinces had been suppressed; Buenos Aires was accepted 
as the undisputed capital of a united Argentine republic; Argentine national 
identity had been considerably strengthened. The ground had been laid for 
Argentina's remarkable economic, social and political transformation during the 
following half century. 
Brazil, which had made the major contribution to the war effort to which 
victory was due, suffered human losses totalling at least 25-50,000 in combat, 
and more from disease (though probably less than the total of 100,000 sometimes 
claimed). The financial cost of the war put a great strain on Brazil's public 
finances. Brazil had, however, gained from Paraguay all the territory it claimed 
between the Rio Apa and the Rio Branco. And Paraguay itself, even more than 
Uruguay, was now firmly under Brazilian influence and control. The war 
6 On the much debated question of Paraguay's losses in the Paraguayan War and the 
demographic impact of the War on Paraguay, the most recent contribution is Vera Blinn 
Reber, 'The demographics of Paraguay: a reinterpretation of the Great War, 1864-70', 
Hispanic American Historical Review, vol. 68, no. 2 (1988). But see also 'Critique' by 
Thomas L. Whigham and Barbara Potthast, in Hispanic American Historical Review, vol. 
70, no. 4 (1990). 
stimulated Brazilian industry, directly in the case of cotton textile mills (for army 
uniforms) and Rio's arsenal, indirectly as a result of the protectionism provided 
by the higher general import tariffs imposed to finance government deficits. The 
war also modernised somewhat Brazil's infrastructure and rudimentary state 
organisation, which suddenly and unexpectedly became responsible for the 
recruitment, training, clothing, arming and transportation of a large standing 
army. 
The Paraguayan War sharpened social tensions in Brazil in a number of ways 
- the inevitable result of mass mobilisation (and de-mobilisation). On balance it 
advanced the cause of social reform, and especially the abolition of slavery. It 
is not easy to disentangle the impact of the emancipation of the slaves in the 
United States (and other international influences and pressures at the time, 
notably from England and France) from the impact of the Paraguayan War itself 
in explaining the beginnings of a change in the intellectual and political climate 
in Brazil on the issue of slavery. The war undoubtedly intensified existing fears 
that slavery was Brazil's Achilles heel, that slaves constituted a potentially 
dangerous 'internal enemy'. It was necessary to offer freedom to the thousands 
of slaves recruited to fight in the war. And not least slavery made it difficult to 
justify the war in terms of civilisation versus barbarism. The fact is that, 
prompted by the Emperor, various projects for the gradual, though even now not 
immediate, abolition of slavery in Brazil were brought before the Council of 
State during the early years of the war. At the same time the war provided a 
reason or a pretext for delaying any significant steps. Nevertheless, the ground 
was prepared for the Lei do Ventre Livre, the law of free birth (or 'free 
womb'), introduced and passed immediately after the war in 1871, the most 
important piece of legislation leading to the final abolition of slavery in Brazil 
in 1888.7 
The war also stimulated discussion of political reform in Brazil. The conflict 
between Caxias, the Brazilian (and from January 1868 the Allied) commander 
in chief and leading Conservative politician, and Zacarias, the Liberal Prime 
Minister, which dominated the middle years of the War and which raised for the 
first time in Brazil the question of civilian control of the military, culminated in 
the so-called Conservative 'coup' of July 1868, which was also aimed at slowing 
down progress towards abolition.8 Zacarias's resignation led directly to the 
7 For a brief discussion of slavery, abolition and the War, see Leslie Bethell, 'The 
decline and fall of slavery in nineteenth century Brazil', Transactions of the Royal 
Historical Society, series 6, volume 1 (1991), pp. 79-81. The history of the origins and 
passage of the Law of Free Birth (1871) remains to be written. 
8 An interesting discussion of the significance of the political events of July 1868 in 
Brazil can be found in Richard Graham, 'Brazil from the middle of the nineteenth century 
to the Paraguayan War', in Leslie Bethell (ed.), The Cambridge History of Latin America, 
Vol. Ill (Cambridge, 1985), pp. 789-91. On the militarisation of politics and the 
politicisation of the military in Brazil during the War, see Wilma Peres Costa, A Espada 
break-up of the Progressive-Liberal alliance, the formation of Reform Clubs and 
a Reform Manifesto (May 1869) which raised a wide range of political and 
constitutional issues and proposed among other things greater autonomy for the 
judiciary, limited tenure for senators and a reduction of the powers of the 
Council of State. This was followed by a Radical Manifesto (November 1869) 
which added to the reform agenda an extension of the suffrage, the election of 
provincial presidents and an end to the Emperor's 'moderating power' (used to 
remove Zacarias from power) as well as educational reform and an end to 
slavery, and in December 1870 a Republican Manifesto and the formation of the 
Republican Party. 
Finally, the war produced for the first time in Brazil a modern, professional 
army - created by Caxias to win the war after the defeat of Curupaiti - and one 
that sought to play a political role. The link between the Paraguayan War, the 
questao militar in the 1870s and 1880s and the military coup of November 1889 
that established a republic in Brazil, only eighteen months after the abolition of 
slavery, is too well known to require elaboration here. For Joaquim Nabuco and 
many others the Paraguayan War represented a division of the waters in the 
history of the Empire, both its apogee and the beginning of its decline. Victory 
in the Paraguayan War for Brazil's slave-based Empire came to be seen as 
something of a Pyrrhic victory. 
Historiography 
A wide range of primary sources located in the national libraries and archives 
of Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay as well as Europe (especially 
Britain) and the United States is available to historians of the Paraguayan War. 
The press in particular is an important source in all four countries engaged in the 
War.9 The War also generated an extraordinarily rich iconography. Best known 
perhaps is the work of Candido Lopez, the young painter from Buenos Aires 
who joined the Argentine forces at the outbreak of the war, lost his right arm at 
the battle of Curupaiti, taught himself to paint with his left hand and spent the 
next 20 years painting in oil the scenes and especially the battles he had 
witnessed. Several Brazilian artists, notably Victor Meireles de Lima (Passagem 
de Humaita, Riachuelo) and Pedro Americo de Figueiredo e Melo (Batalha do 
Avai), painted magnificent battle scenes, although unlike Candido Lopez they 
were trapped in the aesthetic of academic neo-classicism first introduced into 
Brazil by the French artistic mission of 1816. More interesting, and useful, 
perhaps, is the work of two outstanding Brazilian caricaturists, the German-born 
Henrique Fleiuss in Semana Ilustrada, Brazil's first great illustrated weekly, and 
de Damocles: o exercito, a Guerra do Paraguai e a crise do imperio (forthcoming). 
9 See, for example, Efraim Cardozo, Hace cien anos. Cronicas de la guerra de 
1864-1870 publicadas en 'La Tribuna' de Asuncion (11 vols., Asuncion, 1967-1980). 
- even more brilliant and certainly more savage - the Italian-born Angelo 
Agostini, first in ODiabo Coxo and O Cabriao in Sao Paulo, then in OArlequim 
and, beginning in 1868, in Vida Fluminense in Rio de Janeiro.10 Paraguayan 
artists whose woodcuts were published in the illustrated journals Cabichui and 
El Centinela also left lasting images of the war, as did a number of early 
photographers. 
There are a large number of valuable first hand accounts of the War. 
Brazilian classics include Reminiscencias da Campanha do Paraguai by General 
Dionisio Cerqueira, Andre Reboucas's Diario, and Alfredo d'Escragnolle 
Taunay's Diario do exercito, Memorias and, above all, La retraite de Laguna 
(written and first published in French in 1871; Portuguese translation 1874). The 
latter, an account of a minor episode in the War, a failed Brazilian military 
operation in Mato Grosso early in 1867, by the then engineer, later novelist 
(Inocencia, 1872) and historian Taunay, is the one undoubted literary 
masterpiece produced by the Paraguayan War. It stands with Os Sertoes by 
Euclides da Cunha, another engineer, as one of the classic works of Brazilian 
literature. Equally valuable are the writings of Bartolome Mitre, published as 
volumes I-VI of the Archivo del General Mitre (Buenos Aires, 1911-13), and 
other Argentine and Paraguayan participants in the War, and not least the 
accounts of foreign combatants and outside observers. These include The War in 
Paraguay (1869) by Colonel George Thompson, the former British army officer 
and specialist in fortifications and entrenchment who was one of Solano Lopez's 
senior military commanders until his capture by the Allies in 1868; Seven 
Eventful Years in Paraguay (1869) by George Frederick Masterman, the young 
British military apothecary who directed the pharmaceutical services of the 
Paraguayan army until his arrest for plotting against Solano Lopez in 1868; 
Letters from the Battlefields of Paraguay (1870) by Sir Richard Burton, the 
famous British orientalist and explorer, who was British consul in Santos at the 
time and visited the war zone in 1868 and again in 1869; and a two volume 
History of Paraguay (1871) by Charles Ames Washburn, who was US minister 
in Asuncion until his expulsion in 1868. 
The modern secondary literature directly concerned with the Paraguayan War 
can for the most part be grouped chronologically into (a) books published from 
the late 1920s to the early 1960s and (b) books published in the late 1960s and 
1970s. The first group, beginning with Pelham Horton Box, The Origins of the 
Paraguayan War (1927), still a classic work, consists of useful but traditional 
(predominantly diplomatic) accounts of the origins of the War, for which Solano 
Lopez was largely blamed, and (predominantly military) accounts of the War 
itself, concentrating on how Solano Lopez was defeated: Tasso Fragoso (1934), 
10 See Herman Lima, Histdria da Caricatura no Brasil, 4 vols (Rio de Janeiro, 
1963), vol. 1. I am grateful to Maria Eduarda Marques for drawing my attention to this 
and other sources on the work of Brazilian and foreign artists during the Paraguayan War. 
Carcano (1939-41), Spalding (1940), Cardozo (1954, 1961), Teixeira Soares 
(1955, 1956), etc., together with one general narrative history of the war by a 
US historian, still with all its limitations the best synthesis in English: Charles 
Kolinski, Independence or Death! The Story of the Paraguayan War (1965). In 
the second group are a number of stimulating, but not altogether convincing, 
revisionist works, in which Paraguay appears as the victim not only of Brazil, 
Argentina and Uruguay but also of capitalist and imperialist aggression (indeed 
genocide), with Britain as 'the Fourth Ally' in the War: Pomer (1968), 
Chiavenatto (1979), Fornos Penalba (1979), etc - with only Tate (1979) and 
Herken Krauer (1983) offering a different view of Britain's role - together with 
two excellent books by US historians: John Hoyt Williams, The Rise and Fall of 
the Paraguayan Republic, 1800-1870 (1979), the best history of the Paraguayan 
republic up to and including the War since Efraim Cardozo, Paraguay 
independiente (1949), and Harris Gaylord Warren, Paraguay and the Triple 
Alliance (1978) on the treatment of the defeated Paraguay by Brazil and 
Argentina in the decade after the war. 
Since the late 1970s the Paraguayan War has received disappointingly little 
attention from historians. Only a very few books, notably Salles (1990), and a 
handful of articles, notably Abente (1987), Reber (1988), and Pastore (1994), all 
cited in footnotes above, have offered the results of new research or new 
interpretations of what is already known. A number of promising new themes -
the War and state building, the War and economic development, the War and 
social change, the War and national identity, the War and citizenship - have 
scarcely begun to be explored. The Paraguayan War awaits its modern historian. 

Part II. British Imperialism and the Paraguayan War 
Introduction 
In The Age of Capital, 1848-1875 (London, 1975), Eric Hobsbawm described the 
1860s as 'by any standards....a decade of blood'. He had in mind, above all -
besides the continuing Taiping Civil Wars in China - the US Civil War (1861-
65) and the War of the Triple Alliance (Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay) against 
Paraguay (1865-70), both of which witnessed the kind of uncontrolled slaughter 
and destruction associated more with 20th century than with 19th century wars, 
as well as the somewhat less bloody wars in Europe for the political unification 
of Italy and Germany which culminated at the end of the decade in the Franco-
Prussian War of 1870-71. The US Civil War and the Paraguayan War, he 
suggested, were in their different ways both part of the process of global 
capitalist expansion. The Paraguayan War, for example, he regarded as a 
consequence of the integration of the River Plate basin into the British world 
economy: 'Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil, their faces and their economies 
turned to the Atlantic, forced Paraguay out of [its] self sufficiency'.11 In 
Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America (New York, 1967) Andre 
Gunder Frank had offered a similar interpretation of the significance of the 
Paraguayan War but in the advance of liberal capitalism in Latin America in the 
middle decades of the 19th century he had assigned a more active role to the 
'metropolitan powers', by which he meant, above all, Britain. The metropolitan 
powers, he argued, had 'aided their Latin American junior trade partners with 
arms, naval blockades and, where necessary, direct military intervention and 
[the] instigation of wars such as that of the Triple Alliance versus Paraguay' (my 
italics).12 
For almost a century explanations of the causes and origins of the Paraguayan 
War had emphasised territorial disputes between Argentina and Paraguay and 
between Brazil and Paraguay, conflict over rights to free navigation on the rivers 
Parana and Paraguay and free access to regional markets, the growing interests 
of the Brazilian Empire (and, more particularly, the interests of the province of 
Rio Grande do Sul) in Uruguay, Argentina's desire under President Bartolome 
Mitre (1862-8) to consolidate its newly established political unity, and threats to 
* This is a revised and expanded verion of a paper presented at the international 
colloquium on the Paraguaian War held at the Biblioteca Nacional in Rio de Janeiro on 
23 November 1994 and subsequently published in Maria Eduarda Castro Magalhaes 
Marques (coord.), Guerradoparaguai; 130 anos depois (Rio de Janeiro: Editores Relume 
Dumara, 1995). 
11 E.J. Hobsbawm, The Age of Capital, 1848-1875 (London, 1975), p. 78. 
12 Andre Gunder Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America (New 
York, 1967; revised and enlarged edition, 1969), p. 287. 
the regional balance of power posed, above all. by the expansionist policies of 
Paraguay's dictator (from 1862) Francisco Solano Lopez. Still the classic 
account, Pelham Horton Box's The Origins of the Paraguayan War (2 vols., 
Urbana Illinois, 1927) has nothing whatsoever to say about any British 
involvement in the War. In the late 1960s and the 1970s, however, Paraguay was 
portrayed as the victim of capitalist and imperialist aggression - not only in the 
general historical literature but also in the more specialised monographs on the 
subject, notably Leon Pomer's La guerra del Paraguay: gran negocio! (Buenos 
Aires, 1968); not only by Marxist or Marxist influenced historians under the 
spell of the dependency school but equally by historians of the nationalist right, 
and not only in London and New York but more especially in Argentina, Brazil, 
Uruguay and, naturally, in Paraguay itself. Argentina and Brazil had become 
dependent 'client states' primarily acting on behalf of British interests. Britain 
had become the main 'instigador, financista y beneficiador' of the Paraguayan 
War. 
The argument was perhaps most comprehensively synthesised and presented 
in its most extreme form by a Nicaraguan historian, Jose Alfredo Fornos 
Penalba, in an unpublished PhD thesis.13 For him Britain was an 'indispensible 
fourth ally' in the war against Paraguay, in some ways 'the most implacable of 
all independent Paraguay's 19th century foes'. In promoting, supporting and, 
above all, financing the war of aggression against Solano Lopez waged by its 
'neo-colonies', Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil, Britain's aim was not only to 
open up Paraguay, the one remaining closed economy in Latin America after 
independence, to British manufactured goods and to British capital and to secure 
new sources of raw materials (especially cotton, in view of the disruption of US 
supplies as a result of the Civil War). More than this, Britain aimed once and for 
all to destroy what Frank had called Paraguay's 'genuinely independent, 
autonomously generated development effort' under Dr Jose Gaspar Rodriguez de 
Francia (1811-40) and his successor Carlos Antonio Lopez (1844-62), since it 
offered Latin America an alternative 'nationalist' political, economic and 
ideological model to the international, liberal laissez faire capitalist model being 
imposed in its own interests by Britain. Britain's 'imperialist machinations', 
Fornos Penalba concluded, did much to 'eliminate one of the most promising and 
progressive Latin American nations in the 19th century'. 
It was an appealing and intellectually stimulating argument. Unfortunately, 
there is little or no empirical evidence to support it - at least according to the 
most recent and thorough review of Britain's relations with Paraguay in the 19th 
century based on British sources by a British historian (E.N. Tate, 'Britain and 
Latin America in the 19th century: the case of Paraguay, 1811-70', Ibero-
13 Jose Alfredo Fornos Penalba, 'The fourth ally: Great Britain and the War of the 
Triple Alliance', unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of California, Los Angeles, 1979, 
pp. ix-x. 
Amerikanisches Archiv, 1979) and the most recent study of the British role in the 
War, also based on British sources, by two Paraguayan historians: Juan C. 
Herken Krauer and Maria Gimenez de Herken, Gran Bretana y la Guerra de la 
Triple Alianza (Asuncion, 1983). The most comprehensive modern study of 
Britain's relations with Latin America ( Rory Miller, Britain and Latin America 
in the 19th and 20th centuries, London, 1993), which contains only half a dozen 
passing references to Paraguay, dismisses the Paraguayan War itself in one page. 
The most comprehensive modern study of British imperialism (P.J. Cain and 
A.G. Hopkins, British Imperialism, vol. 1 Innovation and Expansion, 1688-1914, 
vol. 2 Crisis and Deconstruction, 1914-90, London, 1993), even though, 
unusually, it includes substantial chapters on South America (though not, 
curiously, Latin America), contains not one single reference to Paraguay or the 
Paraguayan War. 
Britain and Latin America in the 19th century: formal and informal empire 
Let me begin my discussion of British imperialism and the Paraguayan War with 
some general remarks on Britain's relations with Latin America in the 19th 
century, in order to demonstrate that if Britain had indeed been the major force 
behind the war of the Triple Alliance against Paraguay it would have been 
pursuing policies and behaving in a manner completely out of line with its 
policies and behaviour in Latin America as a whole at this time.14 
For more than a century - from the Napoleonic wars and, more especially, 
from the dramatic events of 1807-8 in the Iberian Peninsula which eventually led 
to the break-up of the American empires of Spain and Portugal, to the outbreak 
of the First World War in 1914 - Britain was the dominant external actor in the 
economic and, to a lesser extent, political affairs of Latin America. The 19th 
century was for Latin America the 'British century'. This is not difficult to 
explain. In the first place, Britain had been 'present at the creation'. The 
foundations of Britain's political, commercial and financial pre-eminence had 
been firmly laid at the time of the formation of the independent Latin American 
states during the second and third decades of the 19th century. Secondly, from 
1815 until 1860 or 1870 Britain exercised an unchallenged global hegemony and, 
until 1914, a somewhat less secure global supremacy. The British Navy ruled the 
waves. Thirdly, and most importantly, Britain, the 'first industrial nation', the 
'workshop of the world', supplied most of the manufactured and capital goods 
imported into Latin America, and the City of London, the world's major source 
14 For a fuller discussion of Britain's relations with Latin America, and sources for 
figures on British trade with, and British investment in, Latin America in the 19th and 
20th centuries, see Leslie Bethell, 'Britain and Latin America in historical perspective', 
in Victor Bulmer-Thomas (ed.), Britain and Latin America: A Changing Relationship 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press in association with the Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, 1989), pp. 1-24. 
of capital, supplied most of the loans granted to the new Latin American 
governments and most of the capital invested in Latin American infrastructure 
(above all, railways and public utilities), agriculture and mining. Moreover, 
Britain had more than half the world's merchant shipping and British ships 
carried the bulk of the produce exported from Latin America to markets 
throughout the world. Finally, Britain itself was a major market for Latin 
American food and raw materials. In sum, throughout the 19th century Britain 
was Latin America's principal trading partner, the principal investor in Latin 
America and the principal holder of the Latin American public debt. 
Latin America, though relatively peripheral in world affairs, did not entirely 
avoid Great Power rivalry. Britain was challenged in Latin America - most 
frequently and consistently by the United States, especially in Mexico, Central 
America and the Caribbean, and in the three decades before the First World War 
by Germany. But its political and economic pre-eminence was never seriously 
threatened. For its part, except for its attempt both to liberate and to conquer 
Spanish America by means of an invasion of the Rio de la Plata in 1806-7 
(which was, at least in its inception, entirely unauthorised and which in any case 
lasted not much more than a year and came to an inglorious end) and its 
activities in the Bay islands off the northern coast of Honduras and the Mosquito 
Shore on the Caribbean coasts of Honduras and Nicaragua in the middle decades 
of the 19th century, Britain showed no inclination to assume the political and 
military obligations of empire in Latin America.15 As a result, Latin America 
remained the only area of the globe largely free of empire once it had secured 
its independence from Spain and Portugal during the first quarter of the 19th 
century. 
But were the sovereign Latin American states in the 19th century in some way 
part of an 'informal' British empire? The idea that in any discussion of 
imperialism it is important to distinguish between 'formal' empire in which a 
particular territory has been brought under the political and legal-constitutional 
control of an imperial power, and other forms of indirect political subordination 
and control has a long history. Lenin in 1916, for example, described Persia, 
15 There were in fact only three outposts of the British Empire in Latin America, all 
of which had their origins in earlier centuries: (1) Essequibo, Demerara and Berbice on 
the 'wild coast' of northern South America between the Orinoco and the Amazon which 
had been first seized from the Dutch in 1796, formally ceded to Britain by treaty in 1814-
5, and united as the Crown colony of British Guiana in 1831; (2) the Falkland Islands 
(Islas Malvinas) 300 miles off the southern tip of South America which had been first 
settled by the British (East Falkland at least) in 1765-74, occupied (and the Argentines 
already there expelled) in 1833, and declared a Crown colony in 1841; and (3) the Belize 
settlement on the Caribbean coast of Central America, where British logcutters had first 
established themselves in the middle of the 17th century, which had expanded to twice 
the area of the old Spanish concession during the first half of the 19th century, and which 
became the Crown colony of British Honduras in 1862. 
China and Turkey as 'semi-colonial countries'. The term 'informal empire' was 
apparently invented by C.R. Fay in his Imperial Economy and its Place in the 
Foundations of Economic Doctrine, 1600-1932 (Oxford, 1934). It was first used 
in relation to Latin America in a pioneering article by H.S. Ferns, 'Britain's 
informal empire in Argentina, 1806-1914', in the journal Past and Present 
(1953), and given wide prominence in a famous article by J. Gallagher and R.E. 
Robinson, 'The imperialism of free trade' in the Economic History Review 
(1953). The concept has had a long and interesting life, but it was always open 
to the criticism that it was analytically imprecise and often proved vulnerable to 
specialist empirical research. The British historian D.C.M. Piatt and his friends 
and colleagues proved particularly determined (though never totally convincing) 
in their efforts to undermine and discredit it. 
At some stage in the 1970s the debate on informal empire, already confused 
and confusing, was further complicated by the introduction into it of dependency 
theory. Of course there was an imbalance of power, economic and political, 
between Britain and Latin America. Of course it was Britain not Latin America 
that determined the rules governing international economic relations in the 19th 
century. Of course Britain was more important to Latin America than Latin 
America was to Britain. Latin America, it could reasonably be argued, was 
dependent on British loans, investment, technical expertise, imports of 
manufactured and particularly capital goods, shipping, and to a lesser extent 
markets. Perhaps Latin America's dependence on Britain reinforced, if it did not 
actually create, the structural constraints on Latin American development 
(especially industrial development). Finally, the benefits of the relationship 
between Britain and Latin America were no doubt unequal, although it should be 
remembered that the Latin American political and economic elites at least 
('collaborating elites', if you will) on the whole welcomed British economic 
'penetration' and pursued enthusiastically the 'model' of capitalist modernisation 
by means of foreign loans, direct foreign investment, export-led growth, free 
trade and integration into world markets. 
But does such a relationship per se amount to one of 'informal empire'? And 
did Britain pursue a policy of 'informal imperialism', that is to say, actively seek 
to incorporate the formally independent states of Latin America into its 'informal 
empire'? There surely has to be some consistent exercise of power, however 
indirect, by one state over the foreign policy, internal politics and domestic 
economy of another 'independent' state sufficient to be able to coerce the latter 
into doing what it would otherwise not do before we can talk of 'informal 
empire'. 
As far as Britain and Latin America are concerned, Britain naturally promoted 
and defended its interests from its position of relative strength. A good deal of 
political arm-twisting took place behind the scenes; individual diplomats on the 
spot were often inclined to act in a high handed 'imperialistic' manner (not least 
because they were effectively 3-6 months away from the Foreign Office); 
coercive measures - especially naval demonstrations - were undertaken to protect 
the lives, liberties and properties of British subjects or to preserve existing trade 
on a 'fair and equal' most-favoured-nation basis; and on a few occasions -
notably the Anglo-French blockade of the Rio de la Plata in the mid-1840, the 
Anglo-French-Spanish intervention in Mexico in 1861, and the Anglo-German-
Italian blockade of Venezuela in 1902-3 - Britain (with other powers) resorted 
to gunboat diplomacy for the promotion of trade or the collection of debts. On 
the whole, however, considering the extent of Britain's economic superiority -
and Britain's overwhelming naval supremacy - British governments more often 
than not exercised a considerable degree of restraint and were generally 
extremely reluctant to engage in direct interference, much less intervention, in 
the internal affairs of the Latin American sovereign states. 
Britain, Brazil and the River Plate Republics in the period before 1870 
During the half century from independence to the Paraguayan War British 
interest in Brazil and the River Plate republics was almost exclusively 
commercial. As early as the 1820s there were sizeable British communities in 
Rio de Janeiro, Montevideo, and Buenos Aires. At the head of these British 
communities, alongside Britain's diplomatic representatives, were the 
representatives - some transient, some becoming permanent residents - of more 
than 200 London and Liverpool merchant houses. Over half the British merchant 
houses established in Latin America were in Rio de Janeiro, a third in Buenos 
Aires and Montevideo. The merchant house, which has been called the 
predominant institutional expression of British business in Latin America in the 
19th century existed primarily, of course, to import and distribute British goods: 
mainly textiles (cottons, woollens, linens, and so forth), but also other 
manufactured consumer goods (such as ironware, cutlery, porcelain, glass, 
pianos, furniture, hats, stockings etc.) and some capital goods and raw materials, 
especially coal. In the 1820s, for example, Brazil was receiving half its imports 
from Britain, worth £2-3 million per annum, making Brazil Britain's third largest 
market after the United States and Germany. By the early 1870s £25 million 
worth of British goods (10 per cent of total British exports) were being imported 
annually into Latin America. This was a larger proportion than to any other 
continent or any country in the Empire except India. A third of these exports 
went to Brazil, between a fifth and a quarter to Argentina. At the same time 
British merchant houses handled the export of many local primary products 
including Brazilian coffee (although the main market was the United States) and 
Argentine hides and wool. In general, however, most of Latin America's exports 
stagnated during the second, and to a lesser extent, the third quarter of the 19th 
century, which produced a marked imbalance in trade. 
Neither the British, nor other foreigners, invested in Latin America (except, 
to some extent, Brazil) on a major scale for several decades after the financial 
and economic failures of the 1820s. Several loans to the new Latin American 
states, including Brazil and Argentina, many in excess of £1 million, had been 
floated on the London capital market during the years 1822-5. By 1828 every 
state except Brazil had defaulted on at least the interest payments on its foreign 
debt, bringing into existence a host of committees of anxious and angry British 
bondholders. During the period after independence loans continued to be made 
only to Brazil. The great British merchant houses, however, invested modestly 
in internal commerce, land, food processing, even mining, and also provided 
valuable financial services for British and local clients. 
Only in the late 1850s and the 1860s was there a resumption of foreign 
borrowing. A significant financial connection was once again re-established 
between the Spanish American republics and the City of London. Baring 
Brothers, for example, floated loans of £1.5 million for Chile in 1858, £1 
million for Venezuela in 1862, and £1.25 million in 1866 and £1.95 million in 
1868 for Argentina. Brazil and Peru were, however, the major borrowers, 
accounting for at least 50 per cent of total British portfolio investment in Latin 
America before the investment boom of the 1870s and 1880s. N.M. Rothschild 
and Sons, sole agents for the Brazilian government, issued five loans of between 
half a million and two million pounds to Brazil in the 1820s, two loans totalling 
£3.8 million in 1863 and one of £7 million in 1865. (We shall return below to 
the question of the loans to Argentina and Brazil immediately before and during 
the Paraguayan War.) Meanwhile, the first joint stock enterprises, a new type 
of business concern with headquarters in the metropolis, began investing in 
railways in Brazil, Argentina and elsewhere, in public utilities (for example, gas 
companies in all the major cities of Brazil), in land in Argentina and Uruguay. 
And the first British commercial banks - including the London and Brazilian 
Bank (1862), the London and River Plate Bank (1863) and the London Bank of 
Mexico and South America (1863-4), appeared on the scene - and their 
businesses expanded rapidly. By 1865 £80 million and by 1875 £175 million was 
invested in Latin America, 10 per cent of total British investment abroad, most 
of it in Brazil and Argentina, most of it in government bonds and, to a lesser 
extent, railways and public utilities. 
In the half century after independence from Spain and Portugal, as 
commercial and financial links with Britain were consolidated, Argentina and 
Brazil had to put up with their fair share of high-handed, arrogant 
'Palmerstonian' British diplomats intent on telling them how to organise their 
affairs. They were also the victims of the two most blatant examples of gun-boat 
diplomacy by Britain in Latin America in this period: the blockade of the Rio de 
la Plata by the Royal Navy in the mid 1840s (against Rosas and in the interests 
of free trade), which was poorly planned, costly and ultimately futile;16 and the 
activities of the Royal Navy inside Brazilian territorial waters in 1850 (against 
16 The classic work is John F. Cady, Foreign Intervention in the Rio de la Plata, 
1838-50 (Philadelphia, 1929). See also H. S. Ferns, Britain and Argentina in the 
Nineteenth Century (Oxford, 1960), chapter 9. 
slave ships and those who protected them), which brought to a successful 
conclusion Britain's long campaign for the abolition of the Brazilian slave 
trade.17 There is, however, no evidence that Britain exercised the degree of 
control over Argentina and/or Brazil in the early 1860s necessary to manipulate 
them into waging a war against Paraguay, nor any evidence that Britain desired 
to exert such power for such a purpose. In fact, more than a year before the 
outbreak of the Paraguayan War, Brazil had broken off all diplomatic relations 
with Britain as a result of the so-called 'Christie affair' (named after William D. 
Christie, the British minister in Rio de Janeiro from 1860), which had culminated 
in a six day British naval blockade of Brazil (December 1862 - January 1863). 
For 40 years after the failure of the young Scottish merchants John and 
William Parish Robertson to establish themselves in the newly independent 
Paraguay and their eventual expulsion in 1815, Paraguay was regarded by British 
governments and by most British subjects as a remote, backward country of 
which little was known and which was of only marginal interest. There were 
those, not least among the British merchant community in Buenos Aires, who 
believed that Paraguay was an 'American China' of enormous potential as a 
market for British manufactured goods and as a source of raw materials, but they 
were a small minority with little influence over British policy and their views 
were in any case scarcely credible. Britain was interested in trade not only with 
Buenos Aires and Buenos Aires province but also with the interior provinces of 
Argentina (and therefore had a stake in the political unity of Argentina and the 
success of an Argentine Confederation). It also had an interest in the 
maintenance of free navigation on the region's principal rivers, the Parana and 
the Paraguay. But what was sometimes called the 'continental interior' (i.e. 
Paraguay) over which in any case Argentina still claimed sovereignty, and the 
possibilities of trade on the Upper Paraguay, were largely ignored. Paraguay 
remained isolated and trade between Paraguay and Britain insignificant through 
the period. 
It was only in the mid-fifties, after the Argentine Confederation finally 
recognised Paraguay (40 years after separation from Spain) and conceded to 
Paraguay free navigation on the Parana, and after Britain and Paraguay signed 
a treaty of navigation and commerce (March 1853), that Paraguay's foreign trade 
began to grow. Exports multiplied two and a half times in the second half of the 
decade, though largely to Argentina. Neither of Paraguay's two principal export 
products (yerba mate and tobacco) found their way to Britain in any significant 
quantities. Imports doubled in the same period. And here the British played an 
important role. The merchant houses of Buenos Aires, among which the British 
were by far the most important of the foreign houses, and the three British 
houses that were now established in Asuncion began importing British textiles 
17 See Leslie Bethell, The Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade. Britain, Brazil and 
the Slave Trade Question, 1807-1869 (Cambridge, 1970). 
(mainly cotton cloth), hardware, tools, leatherware, porcelain, etc. Paraguay 
operated a more open economy and became committed to a greater degree of 
crecimiento hacia afuera in the 1850s than is generally believed. 
The government of Carlos Antonio Lopez controlled half the land of Paraguay 
and exercised a monopoly over the growth and export of yerba mate and to a 
lesser extent hides and timber. It had no need to look to the London capital 
market for funds (for which it was later much praised by the dependencista 
historians of the 1960s and 1970s). Nevertheless, for both its programme of 
'modernisation from within' (with its emphasis on industry and infrastructure) 
and its programme for a more effective defence against what it saw as predatory 
neighbours the Paraguayan government turned to its agents in London, J. and A. 
Blyth of Limehouse, for the supply of industrial and military hardware (pig iron, 
railway materials, arms and ammunition, even a steam warship or two). It also 
hired carefully selected foreign, mainly British, technicians. In her interesting 
book The British in Paraguay, 1850-70 (Oxford, 1976) Josefina Pla estimated 
that there were in Paraguay in the period before the War 200 British subjects 
(excluding women and children), most of them under contract to the government, 
either as engineers employed in the shipyard, the arsenal at Asuncion, the iron 
foundry at Ibicui, constructing railways and the telegraph, or in the army medical 
corps. Paraguay's chief engineer from 1855 was the Scotsman William K. 
Whytehead. 
The main obstacles to a greater opening of the Paraguayan economy were 
perhaps not so much the economic policies of the Paraguayan government 
(though there were constant complaints from foreign merchants about its 
arbitrary interference in economic matters) as lack of products with an 
international market (an attempt was made to grow cotton but it failed), poor 
communications (the journey by sailing boat from Buenos Aires to Asuncion took 
up to three months) and, above all, lack of British interest. The further 
development of economic relations with Paraguay was simply not a priority for 
the British government, British industrialists and merchants or the City. The only 
effort to secure a more liberal commercial treaty than that of 1853 and the right 
of navigation on the Upper Paraguay which was still denied British ships - that 
by William Christie, then British minister in Buenos Aires, in 1858 - had no 
official authorisation and in any case failed.18 There seems to be no evidence 
of growing interest in Paraguay, either as a market or as a source of raw 
materials. As for British industry's dependence on imported cotton ('white gold') 
about which so much has been made in the literature, the Paraguayan historian 
Diego Abente has shown how Britain had already located alternative sources to 
the USA - the West Indies, Egypt and Brazil - long before the outbreak of the 
18 E.N. Tate, 'Britain and Latin America in the nineteenth century; the case of 
Paraguay, 1811-1870', Ibero-Amerikanisches Archiv, vol. 5, no. 1 (1979), pp. 53-4. 
Paraguayan War.19 Certainly there is no sign that Paraguay's economic 'model' 
(as modified by Carlos Antonio Lopez in the 1850s) was incompatible with 
British interests. Nor was there any project to force Paraguay to enter into closer 
economic ties with Britain and the world economy. 
Charles Henderson, who took up his appointment as Britain's first consul in 
Paraguay in 1854, operated, like his colleagues elsewhere in Latin America, 
under instructions not to involve himself, much less interfere in, the internal 
affairs of the country to which he was accredited. He was specifically instructed 
to discourage Paraguay from looking to Britain in its quarrels with Brazil and 
Argentina. He was to restrict himself to the protection of British lives and 
property. The most serious case Henderson had to deal with was that arising out 
of the arrest and imprisonment in 1859 of Santiago Canstatt, an Uruguayan-born 
British subject, which was not resolved until 1862 when Canstatt was finally 
released by the Paraguayan authorities. Henderson in fact withdrew from 
Asuncion during this time, but apart from a failed attempt to seize the (British-
built) Paraguayan warship Tucuari as it left Buenos Aires harbour, in which 
shots were fired, no force was used by Britain. That is to say, when there was 
an excuse and an opportunity, Britain did not resort to gunboat diplomacy against 
Paraguay.20 (Even if it had been felt sufficiently important to do so - which it 
was clearly not - it would have been difficult, in the Admiralty's view, for 
Britain to coerce land-locked Paraguay with the limited number of warships 
available on the South East Atlantic station.) The case did not even lead to the 
severing of diplomatic relations, although the British minister in Buenos Aires, 
Edward Thornton, who was given responsibility for Paraguay, was on leave for 
16 months during 1862-3 and did not present his credentials in Asuncion until 
August 1864. The British government as usual seemed anxious to forget about 
Paraguay. 
Britain and the Paraguayan War 
On the actual course of events leading to war between Brazil, Uruguay, 
Argentina and Paraguay, Britain had, it seems, little influence. Thornton was 
strongly, openly, indeed notoriously anti-Paraguayan, which has led to a great 
deal of misunderstanding. Before the Brazilian invasion of Uruguay in October 
1864, in defiance of Solano Lopez's ultimatum, Thornton accompanied the 
Argentine representatives to meetings in Montevideo and told the Paraguayan 
Foreign Minister that every nation had a right to insist on satisfaction for injuries 
done to its subjects or citizens even though it might result in war and temporary 
occupation of territory. But this was private diplomacy. The British government 
had no wish to worsen existing quarrels in the Rio de la Plata which, if they led 
19 Abente, op. cit., p. 57, Tables 3 & 4. 
20 Tate, op. cit., pp. 54-6. 
to war, could only threaten British lives and property and British trade. And 
despite his prejudices and preferences Thornton himself consistently used his 
influence in the interests of peace. Tate's examination of the official British 
correspondence at this time reveals no evidence of any desire in London to 
encourage or promote war or any activity either in London or in South America 
to that effect. Nor was the war when it began in any way welcomed by Britain 
or (officially at least) by British representatives on the spot. 
Privately, once the war began, not only Thornton but most British officials 
favoured the Allies. They were critical of the Solano Lopez regime; they had 
(racist?) contempt for Paraguayans; and they generally blamed Paraguay for the 
war. For them, as for Brazilians and Argentines, the war came to represent 
progress and civilisation versus backwardness and barbarism. British interests 
were obviously greater in Argentina and Brazil than in Paraguay. British 
commercial banks and British merchant houses in Rio de Janeiro and Buenos 
Aires naturally favoured and - through their loans and the use of their merchant 
ships to transport arms, specie, correspondence etc. - even supported the Allies. 
British manufacturers sold ironclad warships, iron bars, tubing and plate for the 
building of warships, steam launches, artillery and ammunition to the belligerents 
- i.e. in practice to Brazil and Argentina, since Paraguay quickly came under a 
Brazilian blockade.21 But this was business, an opportunity for private interests 
in Britain, as for that matter in France and Belgium, to do well out of a war. 
There is no evidence that Britain actively and enthusiastically sought Paraguay's 
defeat. Britain remained officially neutral in the war. (Indeed one rare partisan 
act - the British government's making public the text of the secret article in the 
treaty of 1 May 1865 for the dismemberment of Paraguay when it became known 
in 1866 - could be regarded as hostile to the Allies). 
Britain concentrated on ensuring that as far as possible the rivers Parana and 
Uruguay remained open to British merchant ships (too few reached the Paraguay 
for this to be a matter of great concern), while adopting its traditional policy of 
respecting blockades so long as they were effective (even though in the short-
run this often damaged British commercial interests). It is true that Britain made 
little effort to mediate. But it is also true that neither Paraguay nor the Allies 
were much interested in mediation. And now Britain had its own dispute with the 
Paraguayan governent over its refusal to release British subjects held in Paraguay 
against their will (mainly because so many of them were essential to the 
Paraguayan war effort). After the summer of 1865 it was impossible to get out 
of Paraguay. On three occasions British warships went through the Brazilian 
blockade to reach these trapped British subjects.22 But there was no great show 
of force or direct intervention on behalf of the Allies. As British ministers 
insisted throughout, there was never the slightest danger of Britain itself being 
21 On Brazilian government contracts to British firms for arms supplies, see Fornos 
Penalba, op. cit., appendix, XV. This is a topic that merits much more research. 
22 Tate, op. cit., pp. 62-3. 
dragged into the Paraguayan War. 
This brings us finally to the question of British loans. Fornos Penalba quotes 
Napoleon as saying: 'In order to win a war three things are necessary - money, 
more money and still more money'. The 'war machine' of the Allied armies was 
'lubricated by immense British loans and other aid provided the Allies prior to 
and during the War'. He refers to Rothschilds and Barings as the 'best generals 
of the Allied armies'.23 A good deal more research needs to be done into 
British loans at the time of the War. How much was loaned - and when? With 
what degree of enthusiasm? For what precise purpose (insofar as this can be 
determined)? And how significant was it in the context of overall expenditure by 
Brazil and Argentina in the prosecution of the war? The £7 million loan raised 
by Rothschilds for the Brazilian government in September 1865 - and used, it 
has been suggested, to buy warships - merits further investigation in particular. 
No further loans were made to Brazil for the duration of the war. In the case of 
Argentina, Barings offered £1.25 million of Argentine government bonds to 
private individuals and syndicates in 1866, but with London in the middle of a 
financial crisis less than half the subscription was taken up. There was no hope 
of issuing the further loans Argentina required for its war effort. Only in June 
1868 was £1.95 million offered, and these bonds were not finally sold until the 
following year - at less than 75 per cent of their nominal value.24 British 
investors were not, it seems, falling over themselves to bankroll the defeat of 
Paraguay. And the Spanish/Argentine economic historian Carlos Marichal has 
calculated that foreign, mainly British, loans represented only 15 per cent of total 
expenditure by Brazil and 20 per cent of total expenditure by Argentina on the 
Paraguayan War.25 
Two final comments (or sets of comments). First, if the war really was fought 
by Argentina and Brazil on behalf of Britain to destroy the Paraguayan economic 
'model' of autonomous development (or what was left of it in the early 1860s), 
it clearly succeeded. If it was fought for the incorporation of the Paraguayan 
economy into the world capitalist economy it clearly failed. In fact it set back the 
process. Ten years after the end of the war Britain had a mere £1.5 million 
invested in Paraguay - and most of it portfolio rather than direct investment. 
This represented less than one per cent of British investment in Latin America. 
As for trade, not until 1903 did Paraguayan imports from Britain reach 
£100,000, and not until 1913 did Paraguayan exports to Britain exceed 
£50,000.26 Secondly, if Britain really had been as deeply involved in the 
Paraguayan War as some historians would have us believe, it was a well kept 
23 Fornos Penalba, op. citpp. viii, 109. 
24 Philip Zeigler, The Sixth Great Power. Barings 1762-1929 (London, 1988), p. 
234. 
25 Carlos Marichal, A Century of Debt Crises in Latin America: From Independence 
to the Great Depression, 1820-1929 (Princeton, 1989), pp. 92-3. 
26 Abente, op. cit., p. 57. 
secret at home. Sir Richard Burton, the British scholar, diplomat and explorer, 
author of Explorations of the Highlands of Brazil (2 vols., 1869) and Letters from 
the Battlefields of Paraguay (1870), returning to Britain from Paraguay at the end 
of the War found in London a 'blankness of face whenever the word 
Paraguay...was named and a general confession of utter ignorance and hopeless 
lack of interest'.27 
Britain - and Britain's supposed imperialist ambitions - can no longer be 
made the scapegoat for the Paraguayan War. The prime responsibility for the 
War lay with Brazil, Argentina, to a lesser extent Uruguay, and of course, sadly, 
Paraguay itself. 
27 Sir Richard Burton, Letters from the Battlefields of Paraguay (London, 1870), p. 
vii. 

Part III. The Paraguayan War: A Chronology 
Antecedents 
1750 Treaty of Madrid between Spain and Portugal; frontiers of colonial 
Brazil west of the line of Tordesillas (1494) recognised on the basis 
of uti possidetis 
1777 Treaty of San Ildefonso redefined Spanish/Portuguese 
frontiers in the Rio de la Plata 
1808 Arrival of the Portuguese Court in Rio de Janeiro 
1810 'May Revolution' in Buenos Aires 
1811 Paraguay de facto independent 
Rebellion in Banda Oriental of Rio de la Plata for autonomy 
from both Madrid and Buenos Aires 
1813-40 Dictatorship of Dr Jose Gaspar Rodriguez de Francia ('El 
Supremo') in Paraguay 
1816 Independence of the United Provinces of the Rio de la Plata 
(Union fragmented by 1820) 
Portuguese invasion of Banda Oriental 
1821 Formal incorporation of Banda Oriental into Reino Unido de Portugal, 
Brasil e Algarves as Provincia Cisplatina 
1822 Independence of Brazil proclaimed 
1825 Uprising in Banda Oriental against Brazilian rule 
1825-8 War between United Provinces and Brazil for possession of 
the Banda Oriental 
1828 Independence of Banda Oriental as Republic of Uruguay 
after British mediation 
1829-32 Juan Manuel de Rosas governor of Buenos Aires province 
Federal Pact between littoral provinces (Buenos Aires, Entre Rios, 
Santa Fe - and later Corrientes); Buenos Aires establishes de facto 
hegemony over provinces of the Rio de la Plata 
Abdication of Emperor Dom Pedro I in favour of 5-year old son 
(Regency 1831-40) 
Rosas again governor of Buenos Aires province 
Separatist rebellion (Guerra dos Farrapos) in Rio Grande do Sul 
'Guerra Grande' in Uruguay between Blancos and Colorados 
'Majority' of Emperor Dom Pedro II (aged 15) proclaimed 
Death of Francia 
Seige of Montevideo by Rosas 
Brazil recognises independence of Paraguay 
Dictatorship of Carlos Antonio Lopez in Paraguay 
Peace between Blancos and Colorados in Uruguay 
Treaty between Uruguay and Brazil in which Uruguay makes 
territorial and other concessions 
Triple Alliance of Entre Rios province (under General Justo Jose de 
Urquiza), Uruguay and Brazil against Rosas 
Defeat of Rosas at battle of Monte Caseros (February) 
Argentina recognises Paraguay; agreement on free navigation on river 
Parana 
Treaties of free navigation between Paraguay and Britain, Paraguay 
and France and Paraguay and the United States 
Constitution of Federal Republic of Argentina ratified by all provinces 
except Buenos Aires (independent state) 
Urquiza elected president of Argentine Confederation 
Provisional Convention between Paraguay and Brazil on free 














1859 Argentine Confederation victory over Buenos Aires at battle of Cepeda 
(October); Buenos Aires loses independence. 
1860 Bernardo Berro (Blanco) elected president of Uruguay; adopts tougher 
position on Brazilian penetration from Rio Grande do Sul 
Significant Liberal gains in Brazilian parliamentary elections 
1861 Victory of Buenos Aires over Confederation at battle of Pavon 
(September) 
October 1862 - Francisco Solano Lopez succeeds to presidency of Paraguay 
following death of his father Carlos Antonio Lopez 
General Bartolome Mitre, governor of Buenos Aires, becomes first 
constitutional president of united Argentina 
April 1863 - General Venancio Flores and the Colorados, supported by Mitre 
and Brazilian Liberals in Rio Grande do Sul, invade Uruguay from 
Argentina 
July 1863 - Uruguayan mission to Asuncion seeking alliance against Argentina 
and Brazil; Solano Lopez hesitates 
September/November 1863 - Paraguay warns Argentina that independence of 
Uruguay is necessary condition for balance of power in Rio de la Plata 
January 1864 - New Liberal-Progressive government in Brazil under Zacarias 
Gois e Vasconcelos 
February 1864 - General mobilisation in Paraguay 
March 1864 - Berro resigns and hands executive power in Uruguay to Atanasio 
Aguirre, president of Senate 
May 1864 - Jose Antonio Saraiva arrives in Montevideo as head of Brazilian 
diplomatic mission (followed by Vice-Admiral Tamandare and 
Brazilian fleet) 
June-July 1864 - Failure of joint representations to Uruguayan government by 
Saraiva, Rufino Elizalde (Argentine Foreign Minister) and Edward 
Thornton (British minister in Buenos Aires) 
4 August 1864 - Brazilian ultimatum to Uruguay: satisfy demands or reprisals 
30 August 1864 - Paraguayan ultimatum to Brazil warning against intervention 
in Uruguay 
31 August 1864 - Zacarias replaced by Francisco Jose Furtado, another Liberal, 
as President of Council in Brazil (Furtado remains in office until May 
1865) 
16 October 1864 - Brazilian troops invade Uruguay in support of Flores and 
Brazilian navy blockades Montevideo; for Paraguay this is casus belli 
The War 
1864 
12 November - Paraguay precipitates war by seizing Brazilian merchant steamer 
Marques de Olinda, with president of province of Mato Grosso on 
board, after it clears Asuncion for Corumba; as a result Brazil severs 
diplomatic relations with Paraguay 
13 December - Paraguay formally declares war on Brazil and initiates invasion 
of Mato Grosso 
1865 
7 January - Brazilian government decree creates voluntarios da patria 
January - Argentina refuses Paraguay's request for permission to cross Misiones 
in order to attack Rio Grande do Sul and ultimately support the 
Blancos in Uruguay 
February - Fall of Montevideo; Peace of Villa de Union; Colorados victorious 
in Uruguayan civil war; Flores provisional president of Uruguay 
pending elections (never held) 
18 March - Paraguay declares war on Argentina and initiates invasion of 
Argentine province of Corrientes 
13 April - Paraguayan forces capture river port of Corrientes 
1 May - Signing of Treaty of Triple Alliance (Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil) 
against Paraguay. War aims: (1) overthrow of Solano Lopez 
dictatorship; (2) free navigation of river system; and (3 - secret 
clause) annexation of territory claimed by Brazil in Northeast of 
Paraguay and by Argentina in East and West of Paraguay 
May-June - Paraguayan army under Colonel Antonio de la Cruz Estigarribia 
crosses Misiones and invades Rio Grande do Sul at Sao Borja 
11 June - Battle of Riachuelo: Paraguayan navy attacks Brazilian navy but is 
defeated and destroyed; Paraguay in effect blockaded; but Allied 
advance along Rio Paraguay denied by shore batteries at Curupaiti 
and, above all, by the river fortress of Humaita 
5 August - Paraguayan troops capture Uruguaiana 
August - Mitre becomes commander of Allied forces 
September - Loan of £7 million by Rothschilds to Brazil 
14 September - Estigarribia surrenders to Dom Pedro II, Mitre and Flores at 
Uruguaiana 
September-November - Paraguayan army retreats across Parana; withdraws from 
all Allied territory except Mato Grosso; on defensive on southern 
frontier 
1866 
16 April - Allied forces cross Upper Parana river and begin invasion of 
Paraguay; establish themselves at Tuiuti 
24 May - Battle of Tuiuti; first major test of strength; fierce fighting. Paraguay 
fails to dislodge Allies; but no Allied advance until September 
3 August - Zacarias returns to power as head of new Liberal government in 
Brazil 
3 September - Allied victory at Curuzu 
12 September - Meeting of Mitre and Solano Lopez at Yatayti-Cora fails to end 
war 
22 September - Battle of Curupaiti. Allied advance halted; worst defeat of war; 
no further advance until July 1867 
October - Marechal Luis Alves de Lima e Silva, Marques de Caxias, assumes 
command of Brazil's land and sea forces (arrives November) 
November - Anti-war montonero rising in Cuyo province of Argentina led by 
Felipe Varela 
1867 
May-June - Brazilian expeditionary force to Mato Grosso defeated; 'Retirada da 
Laguna' 
22 July - Allied forces under temporary command of Caxias while Mitre in 
Argentina initiates movement to outflank Humaita 
2 August - Allied occupation of position north of Humaita 
18 August - Brazilian warships under command of Vice-Almirante Joaquim Jose 
Inacio attack and pass batteries of Curupaiti 
3 November - Second battle of Tuiuti; Paraguayan forces attack but fail to halt 
movement to encircle Humaita 
1868 
13 January - Caxias replaces Mitre as allied commander; Mitre returns to 
Buenos Aires 
18 February - Brazilian navy passes batteries at Humaita 
19 February - Rebellion in Uruguay led by ex-president Berro; Flores 
assassinated; later same day Berro himself captured, imprisoned and 
assassinated 
22 February - Brazilian navy appears off Asuncion; Solano Lopez retires 
northwards (March) 
12 June - Elections in Argentina; Mitre's heir-apparent, Foreign Minister Rufino 
Elizalde, defeated by Domingo Faustino Sarmiento on anti-war 
platform 
16 July - Conservative government in Brazil under Visconde de Itaborai 
22 July - Humaita evacuated 
5 August - Allied occupation of Humaita 
December - Series of Allied attacks on Paraguayan positions (Campanha da 
Dezembrada); battles of Itororo, Aval, etc.; finally battle of Lomas 
Valentinas (27 December) in which Paraguayan army annihilated; 
Solano Lopez escapes to Cordillera east of Asuncion 
30 December - Colonel George Thompson surrenders last Paraguayan river 
fortification at Angostura 
1869 
1-5 January - Occupation of Asuncion; war assumed over; Caxias retires from 
theatre of operations 
January - Solano Lopez forms new Paraguayan army and initiates guerrilla 
operations 
February - Mission of Jose Maria da Silva Paranhos (future Visconde do Rio 
Branco), Brazilian Foreign Minister, to Buenos Aires and Asuncion 
to discuss formation of provisional Paraguayan government (away 
from Brazil until 1870) 
15 April - Conde d'Eu, son-in-law of Dom Pedro II, arrives as new commander-
in-chief of Brazilian forces 
11 June - Provisional government established in Asuncion 
12 August - Allied forces storm and capture Peribebui, Solano Lopez's provisional capital 
16 August - Battle of Campo Grande or Acosta Nu; Paraguayan troops 
massacred; last major battle of war; Solano Lopez again escapes and 
retreats north 
September 1869-March 1870 - Solano Lopez pursued by Allied forces 
1870 
1 March - Solano Lopez cornered and killed at Cerro Cora in extreme north-east 
of Paraguay; last Paraguayan resistance overcome. 
Post-war 
20 July 1870 - Preliminary treaty signed by provisional government of Paraguay 
with Argentina and Brazil in Asuncion: war over; free river 
navigation; territorial issues to be discussed later 
July 1870 - Elections to Constituent Assembly in Paraguay; new constitution 
(November) 
1870-1 - Conferences in Buenos Aires and Asuncion fail to lead to general peace 
treaty; agreement to conduct separate negotiations 
9 January 1872 - Peace treaties between Brazil and Paraguay; Brazil secures 
territory claimed in Northeast Paraguay between Rio Apa and Rio 
Branco 
February 1876 - Peace treaties between Paraguay and Argentina; Argentina 
retains Misiones, secures Chaco Central between rivers Bermejo and 
Pilcomayo, agrees to submit territory between the Pilcomayo and Rio 
Verde to US arbitration, and renounces claims north of Rio Verde 
(also claimed by Bolivia) 
22 June 1876 - Last Brazilian troops evacuated from Paraguay 
November 1878 - US President Hayes awards to Paraguay area disputed by 
Paraguay and Argentina 
May 1879 - Evacuation of last Argentine troops from Paraguay 
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